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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
that if the transferor-court does not have service of process over
the defendant and the defendant is not amenable to service of process
in the transferee-district, even though venue is proper in both districts,
the transferor-court could not transfer the action because both courts
lack personal jurisdiction over the defendant, unless he submits
thereto. Certainly if the transferor-court does not have jurisdiction
over the defendant's person, the transferee-court could not obtain
jurisdiction by the act of transfer alone. Wilson v. Kansas City So.
Ry., 101 F. Supp, 56 (W.D. Mo. 1951); Scarmardo v. Mooring, 89
F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1950)
The decision in the principal case has clarified the interpretation
of the statute and has set out a rule to be followed in the future.
Since personal jurisdiction is not prerequisite to transfer, the use of the
section will be expanded to situations where the plaintiff, acting in
good faith, mistakenly believes the defendant to be a resident of the
transferor-district. This will enable the federal courts to more swiftly
and easily adjudicate cases to the best interests of the parties con-
cerned.
Frank Thomas Graff, Jr.
Labor Law-Norris-LaGuardia Act-Power of Federal Court
to Enjoin Breach of No Strike Clause
An employer and union agreed to arbitrate all grievances con-
cerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. The union
also promised to engage in no strikes or work stoppages. However, on
nine different occasions during a period of nineteen months, pro-
duction was in fact interrupted by labor strife. The employer sought
injunctive relief, but both the district and circuit court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court in a five to
three decision, held, affirmed. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1958) proscribes injunctive relief against concerted activities
arising out of labor disputes. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S.
238 (1962).
In construing § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958), the United States Supreme Court decided
that Congress intended federal substantive law fashioned from na-
tional labor policy to apply in labor disputes. Textile Workers of
America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Supreme Court
held in that case that a federal district court could grant specific per-
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formance of an employer's promise to arbitrate, although the state
law of the particular jurisdiction would not compel such relief under
an executory agreement. Implicit in that decision is that the role of
federal courts is not to settle arbitral matters, but to oversee promises
to arbitrate in collective agreements. Local 95, Office Employes
Union v. Nekossa-Edward Paper Co., 287 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1961);
Radio Corp. of America v. Association of Professional Eng'r Per-
sonnel, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898
(1961). The question then arose whether a federal district court had
the power to enjoin the breach of a no strike clause. Gregory, The
Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MicH. L. REv. 635 (1959).
In the Tenth Circuit, the question was affirmatively answered when
that court held the voluntary promise not to strike precluded union
reliance on the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Teamsters Union v. Yellow
Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1961), rev'd per
curiam, 370 U.S. 711 (1962). Several circuits ruled to the con-
trary, and the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in the principal
case.
The declared policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act is that a worker
shall be free from interference and restraint in concerted activities for
mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958). The LMRA de-
clared its purpose is to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either employer, worker or union with
the legitimate rights of the other. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (b) (1958). The
Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits injunctive relief in cases involving
non-violent strikes, picketing, and advising and urging such activities.
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958). Section 301 (a) of the LMtRA provides that
a union is amenable to suit in federal court. The issue is whether § 301
(a) prescribes injunctive relief as an orderly procedure to promote the
free flow of commerce and prevent interference by a union with the
legitimate rights of an employer.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act apparently confers no right on the
laboring class by its express provisions, regardless of the language
used in the policy statement. Rather it withdraws and limits the power
of federal courts to issue injunctions. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). Marine
Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960). An
employer has the right to contract, and to have such contractually
created rights enforced, but § 301 (a) did not expressly state how such
rights were to be enforced in federal courts. Thus, where damages
is manifestly an inadequate remedy, is there room for accommo-
dation of the two acts?
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The majority of the Supreme Court deemed accommodation a
mere play on words, and that it could only decide whether Congress
impliedly repealed the Norris-LaGuardia Act. W. L. Mead Inc. v.
Teamster Union, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954), appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 802 (1955); A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250
F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). The
dissent on the contrary would not enforce the express provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, where it was obviously "not promoting the
arbitration process as a substitute for economic warfare." Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Thus,
where a union failed to arbitrate a minor dispute as required by the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958), a subsequent strike was
enjoinable in spite of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). The
majority distinguished this case on the ground that the union action
was a clear violation of an affirmative statutory duty.
The majority relied on the fact that the LMRA explicity made
the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable in three instances. Two sec-
tions permit Government petition for injunctive relief. 29 U.S.C. (§§)
160 (h), 178 (b) (1958). A third permits a private litigant to bring
the suit. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (e) (1958). The dissent replied that in the
instances above the effect of outright repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was clear, but the effect of permitting the use of the injunction
in cases involving collective agreements was not forseeable.
If fedral substantive law is to govern in labor relations, state
courts may be prohibited from giving injunctive relief, where a no
strike clause has been ignored. The California Supreme Court held
that it was not precluded from doing so. McCarroll v. Los Angeles
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
However, where the federal courts apply state law in diversity of
citizenship cases, differences in federal practice must not so affect the
outcome that a contrary result would be reached in a state court.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The outcome
determinative test is perhaps fitted for barring state relief. Such a
problem will not arise in West Virginia for the Legislature has enacted
no statute which authorizes "suits or actions in any form against that
class of unincorporated associations known as labor unions." Milam
v. Settle, 127 W. Va. 271, 32 S.E.2d 269 (1944). In a later case,
whether the party sued was a labor union was not decided by the trial
court, and the court, therefore, did not meet the issue. Ohio Valley
Advertising Corp. v. Local 207, Sign Painters, 138 W. Va. 356, 76
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S.E.2d 113 (1953). The complaint, however, referred to the party as
a union. Rule 4 (d) (9) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure does provide how process shall be issued against unincor-
porated associations, but should not be read to alter substantive law.
LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, WEST VIRGINIA RULES 48 (1960).
Perhaps the best summation of what became the majority view
was by Judge Wright in a Louisiana district court opinion. "Even if
this court read the weathervane as indicating a judicial overruling of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in these situations and thought that solution
desirable, it could not presume to ignore the plain mandate of appli-
cable statutes in order to achieve a result in accord with its private
views of what the law ought to be." Baltimore Contractor's Inc. v.
Carpenters' Dist. Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. La. 1960). Thus,
it seems the only avenue of corrective process is Congress.
James Kilgore Edmundson, Jr.
Torts-A New Test for Proximate Cause?
P, while pushing a stalled automobile, was injured when struck
by a passing automobile owned and driven by D. In an action for
damages brought against only one of the joint tort-feasors, the trial
judge instructed the jury that if the conduct on the part of D "contri-
buted proximately" to P's injuries, they might find in favor of P
against D, unless the jury further believed that P, at the time of the
accident was not using due care in his own behalf. The jury returned
a verdict for P. Held, affirmed. Although the use of "contributed
proximately" in an instruction standing alone may have been some-
what misleading, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed on its
account where the objection was removed by the giving of other in-
structions consistent with the law. Metro v. Smith, 124 S.E.2d 460
(W. Va. 1962).
For the plaintiff to recover in an action for personal injuries,
there must be some reasonable connection between the defendant's
negligence and the injury sustained. This has been dealt with almost
universally by the use of the term "proximate cause". However, at
this point the universality ends. The doctrine of proximate cause has
developed a chameleon-like quality as a result of which courts have
in case after case attempted to clarify its meaning. To illustrate the
confusion and uncertainty of the application of this doctrine of proxi-
mate cause, the courts have used the "but for" rule, the "nearest
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